Secularism and Islamophobia: On the strategic use of “neutrality” in the Canadian public sphere

In this blog, Hannah Mckillop explores how the Canadian state use of the term “neutrality” can negatively impact religious minorities in the public sphere.

Hannah McKillop

Neutrality rhetoric is used by Canadian courts and governments to further state-sanctioned ideologies around what it means to be a secular nation. Such ideologies, however, inhibit the freedoms of minority populations who are outwardly religious. Canadian courts cite gender equality, religious freedom, public safety, pluralism, and social connection as central justifications for their “neutral” secular policies. The consequences of such policies, however, are not neutral.

Zunera Ishaq v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration exemplifies the ways in which conceptualizations of neutrality impact the freedoms of Muslim communities in Canada. After Zunera Ishaq’s citizenship application was approved in 2013, she raised concerns that during the citizenship ceremony she would be asked to remove her niqab to recite the citizenship oath. Her concerns were not unwarranted. At the time, an official government policy required all citizenship candidates to remove face coverings during the recitation of the oath. In the case, the gender equality arguments used by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration exemplify how rhetoric around state neutrality is used to justify policies that disproportionately affect minority populations in Canada.

Though the Court in Ishaq ruled in favor of allowing Muslim women to wear their religious dress during Canada’s citizenship ceremony, the arguments furthered by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration demonstrate how rhetoric around neutrality is wielded to justify discrimination. The Minister argued that because the ceremony is a “public act,” candidates should not cover their faces. All candidates must “recite the oath openly and equally.”[i] That is, without wearing a full-face veil. Here, the Minister is arguing for a very particular sort of openness and equality that, in effect, discriminates against citizens whose religious practices include face coverings. The Minister argued that the policy was “neutral,” even though it disproportionately affected Muslim women like Ishaq.[ii] As Ishaq shows, the Policy’s impact on Muslim women was anything but impartial.

Another example where rhetoric around neutrality is used to justify discriminatory secularist policies is Bill 21. Quebec’s Bill 21 is titled, “An Act respecting the laicity of the State.” In Quebec, laicity is based on four principles: “the separation of State and religions, the religious neutrality of the State, the equality of all citizens, and freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.” Bill 21 seeks to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols while engaging in the public sphere.

Bill 21 cites state neutrality, equality, and freedom to justify banning all religious symbols from the public sphere. Such rhetoric, however, limits the movement of Muslim women particularly in areas of public life that are disproportionately accessed by women, like childcare and educational centres.[i] In Bill 21, the Quebec government upholds a limited conception of equality that does not consider the needs, concerns, freedoms, or agency of Muslim citizens. Rhetoric around neutrality is used by the Quebec government in Bill 21 to justify limiting the freedoms of visible religious minorities in Quebec.

Other arguments used in Bill 21 to justify secular policies are religious equality and religious freedom. As Effie Fokas states, it is counter-intuitive for Western courts to cite pluralism and tolerance to justify restricting public expressions of religious identity.[i] Bans on religious dress force visible religious minorities out of the public sphere, increase prejudice, and perpetuate violence against minority populations.[ii] Legislation governing religious dress, while citing neutrality as justification, targets a very specific demographic – visible religious minorities.

This dynamic is present in Bill 21 when the Quebec government cites “the religious neutrality of the State” as an appropriate reason to justify the ban on religious dress in the public sphere. What does “neutral” really mean in this context? Asking a veil-wearing woman to unveil is not a neutral act. Such an ask is in direct violation of her rights as a Canadian citizen. Does the “neutrality of the State” mean the State should only serve citizens who are not visibly religious? If so, what impact will Quebec’s approach to secularism have on Muslim women?

Jennifer Selby et al. explore how rhetoric around neutrality that is utilized by secular governments is not gender neutral. Discourse around the neutral treatment of citizens assumes that being a woman in public means expressing or enhancing feminine features like the hair and face.[i] Western discourses about Muslim women assume that they need to be freed from oppressive religion. Secularism is correlated with neutrality and freedom, while religion is correlated with oppression.[ii] Consequently, the personal agency of a veil-wearing woman is difficult to understand.[iii]

Muslim women are expected to adopt a secular framework that suggests they need to be taught the values of Western society. Those who do otherwise are cast as “foreigners” who follow “cultural” practices that are considered undesirable and incompatible with Canadian society.[i] This is evident when the niqab is seen as a personal cultural practice.[ii] Federally, Canada promotes a diverse, multicultural society. Multiculturalism is enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms under section 27. Section 10 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms affirms the rights and freedoms of everyone no matter their sex, gender, or religious identity.

When Muslim practices are characterized as cultural, religious freedom protections are not guaranteed. As a result, accommodation requests are sometimes viewed as unreasonable and incompatible with Canadian culture.[i] This counters Canada’s approach towards multiculturalism and diversity. Courts deem that their conception of secularism and state neutrality upholds universal freedoms, despite the negative impacts Muslims (and other minorities) experience from these discriminatory policies. What the majority considers neutral treatment is considered oppressive treatment by Canadian minorities. Canada’s approach to secularism should not include rhetoric that justifies discriminating against visible religious minorities.

In July 2021, the European Court of Justice ruled that private employers can ban workers who wear religious symbols like headscarves. The court argued the ruling aligned with “political, philosophical, and religious neutrality.”[i] As The Guardian notes, the ruling contradicts a 2013 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that allowed crosses to be worn in the workplace. Secularism (and nonreligion by extension) are not necessarily “neutral” ideologies that always promote an equal and open public sphere. Policies that support state neutrality can often inhibit the full participation of certain social groups in society – particularly groups that already face discrimination and marginalization. Studies on nonreligion and secularism must consider how rhetoric around neutrality is used to justify discriminatory policies in the name of secularism.

Hijab-wearing women holding a neon yellow sign with red text that states: “Touches pas à ma Liberté” that translates in English to: “Don’t touch my Freedom”

Photo Source:

Hannah McKillop is a PhD student in the Department of Classics and Religious Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her research focuses on the intersections between nonreligion, ethics, and popular culture in North America. Her MA work explored the ritual use of the Harry Potter series on the podcast “Harry Potter and the Sacred Text.” She is a member of the Student Caucus of the Nonreligion in a Complex Future project.

[i] Jennifer Rankin, “EU Companies Can Ban Employees Wearing Headscarves, Court Rules,” The Guardian, July 15, 2021, sec. Europe,

[i] Selby, Barras, and Beaman, “Figures That Haunt the Everyday,” 52.

[i] Selby, Barras, and Beaman, 52.

[ii] Ishaq at para. 16.

[i] Jennifer A. Selby, Amélie Barras, and Lori G. Beaman, “Figures That Haunt the Everyday,” in Beyond Accommodation: Everyday Narratives of Muslim Canadians (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 44.[ii] Selby, Barras, and Beaman, 44.

[iii] Selby, Barras, and Beaman, 45.

[i] Effie Fokas, “The Legal Status of Religious Minorities: Exploring the Impact of the European Court of Human Rights,” Social Compass 65, no. 1 (2018): 29.

[ii] Jonathan Montpetit, “Muslim Women Report Spike in Harassment, Discrimination since Bill 21 Tabled,” CBC, May 14, 2019,

[i] “An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State,” Pub. L. No. Bill 21, CQLR c R-26.2.01 (2019), 12.

[i]  Ishaq v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 156 (CanLII), [2015] 4 FCR 297, <;, at para. 37. Hereinafter “Ishaq”.[ii] Ishaq at para. 11.

Eating Animals, Nonreligion and Reconciling Human-Nonhuman Relations

In this blog, Anna Sofia Salonen considers the need to incorporate nonreligious people when looking at the relationships between humans and nonhumans.

Eating in general, and eating animals in particular, is a key aspect when considering human relationships with nonhuman others. It is also a question at the heart of the study of religion. How people relate to the question of eating animals is pivotal in many religions and embedded in theological questions concerning human relationships with and responsibilities towards nonhuman creation. But how should we approach the question of eating animals in a world where nonreligion is thriving? Does the rapid rise of nonreligion change how people relate to the nonhuman world, or even who we eat?

Christianity has been accused of promoting a theology of dominion that sets humans above nature as masters and abusers. This position justifies humans’ overconsumption of the earth’s food sources. On the other hand, the Christian idea of stewardship coveys an idea that humans should take care of the world around us. However, with the implicit hierarchy between humans and the rest of creation, the idea of stewardship also implies that the nonhuman world is a resource to be utilized for human use.

Lately, Christian thinkers have explored insightful new ways of envisioning humanity’s place and responsibility within creation (e.g. Warners & Heun 2019). This relationship would be based on reconciled relations between humans and nonhuman others and lead to more sustainable eating practices. Reconciliation is a theological concept that addresses the renewal of relationships. It is said to remove distortion and create the conditions for harmonious relationships (Voster 2018).

As fruitful as these explorations of restored relations might otherwise be, they often exclude many people from their scope by referring to their audiences as “we Christians”. This seemingly inclusive, yet ultimately exclusive language not only ignores other religions, but also nonreligious people. In the face of the environmental crisis, the challenge to reconcile broken relations between humans and nonhuman others, which includes changing harmful eating practices, confronts all people regardless of religious or nonreligious identity.

There is a need to explore humanity’s place and responsibilities within the world that expand and transcend religious boundaries and make room for nonreligious views and practices. A way forward is to seek points of converge between religious and nonreligious views. In my research on ordinary people’s accounts of eating animals, I found that concepts of dominion, stewardship and reconciliation all resonate in how both religious and nonreligious people talk about their food choices (Salonen 2019).

What I found was, first, that the idea of human dominion over the rest of creation does not only appear in explicitly religious accounts. Nonreligious people use this framing too. They do so by drawing from an idea that humans are naturally carnivores or animals who eat other animals. Further, human dominion is accounted when resorting to the idea that eating animals is a matter of unrestricted individual choice. This view echoes human dominion where people can choose freely what they consume.

Second, my research has found that both religious and nonreligious people draw from a cultural imaginary that emphasizes responsible stewardship. The language of stewardship has influenced the way people, whether religious or nonreligious, tend to comprehend the human-animal relations. In other words, identifying as nonreligious does not straightforwardly lead to the rejection of the idea of human dominion nor stewardship, views which have often been associated with religion, and in particular Christianity.

Further, both religious and nonreligious imaginaries can contain efforts to reconcile detrimental relations between the human and nonhuman world, which are epitomized in how humans mistreat food animals and the factory farm system. The possibility for reconciliation opens once people acknowledge that their eating patterns can cause suffering to animals and when they are no longer sure what the right way to approach the question of eating animals actually is. In other words, reconciliation requires uncertainty, willingness to question one’s actions and withdrawal from justifying one’s views.

Due to this uncertainty and ambivalence, pursuits towards reconciliation and respect do not automatically lead to rejecting eating animals completely, but they can herald a more conscious consumption of animal meat. However, in the context of contemporary consumer society, there is hardly a cultural repertoire that would foster nonreligious expressions of reconciliation. Without ways to express the need and will to reconcile and show respect to food animals, people are left with justifying their existing eating practices rather than seeking change. 

The case of eating animals shows that there is a need to incorporate nonreligious people into the scope of analyses that focus on relationships between humans and nonhumans. The concepts of dominion, stewardship and reconciliation help to make sense of how religious and nonreligious people navigate the consequences of their everyday actions. These ideas guide people in how they tend to see the world – and perhaps inhibit seeing the world in a different light.

Nonreligious people are not one and the same. They do not form a unified group in terms of how they see themselves and the world, and in many ways, they are indistinguishable from the rest of the population. Yet, despite this diversity, it is not enough to approach nonreligion as an absence of religion, or as an abandonment of religiously influenced cultural repertoires of thinking and acting.

Nonreligion and food can bring out points of convergence between religious and nonreligious views. Only a small fraction of people in my study framed their ideas and ideals about eating animals in explicitly religious terms, yet much of what they said resonates with theological accounts that discuss human-nonhuman relations and the humans’ roles and responsibilities in the world. Nonreligious people are both affected by and participate in constituting, reproducing and reimagining relations between humans and nonhuman world. Thus, their views should be counted when discussing these issues.

Keywords: dominion; stewardship; reconciliation; meat consumption; food consumption; nonreligion

Sources Cited

Salonen, A. S. 2019. Dominion, stewardship and reconciliation in the accounts of ordinary people eating animals. Religions 10(12), 669.

Vorster, J. M. 2018. The doctrine of reconciliation: Its meaning and implications for social life. In die Skriflig/In Luce Verbi 52: 1–8.

Warners, D. P. & M. K. Heun, eds. 2019. Beyond Stewardship. New Approaches to Creation Care. Grand Rapids: Calvin College Press.

Anna Sofia Salonen is a theologian and sociologist of religion, with a broad interest in nonreligion, food consumption, morality, everyday life and social inequality. She works as an Academy of Finland postdoctoral researcher at Tampere University, Finland. Her current project (Im)moderation in everyday food consumption (2018-2021) explores the content and construction of ethical lives of ordinary people by asking what they consider to be moderate with regards to food consumption and by analyzing how they construct these views.

Atheists and Evangelicals in the United States and Canada: No Love Loss

In this blog Joel Thiessen and Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme discuss recent findings from their research which explores Nonreligious identity in the US and Canada. In looking at how different (non)religious groups perceive each other, in particular, they discuss how religious nones tend to be more suspicious and critical of religious groups that they believe are “exclusive,” and more open to groups they perceive to be “inclusive”.

As the proportion of those who say they have no religion grows in both the United States and Canada, one question worth considering is ‘how “religious nones” perceive and are perceived by members of other religious traditions’. This question is especially significant as both countries experience increasing (non)religious diversity, particularly in regions once dominated by various Christian traditions that now find their proportionate representation of the population on the decline. This is one topic that we tackle near the end of our book with New York University Press, None of the Above: Nonreligious Identity in the US and Canada. For discussion of our other findings, see our two earlier NSRN blog posts: “The Religious Nones of North America, and the Beginnings of a Book Project” (July 2017) and “Subtypes of Religious Nones in the United States and Canada” (June 2018).

Drawing upon a range of survey and interview data, two key findings stand out in our research. First, atheists—as a subset of religious nones—and evangelicals reserve their strongest negative views for one another. This polarization is present in both the United States and Canada, but is especially pronounced in the United States. Second, religious nones generally hold more negative views toward perceived “exclusive” groups, and positive views toward perceived “inclusive” groups.

Beginning with atheists and evangelicals in the United States, we turn to our analysis of the raw data from the 2017 Pew American Trends Panel. This survey included a 0-100 feelings thermometer question based on different (non)religious groups. The higher the score, the more positive respondents felt toward the group in question. Overall, Jews (66), Catholics (65), mainline Protestants (63), and Evangelicals (61) scored the highest, while atheists (50) and Muslims (48) scored the lowest. When comparing members of different religious traditions’ perceptions toward atheists in particular, Jews scored the highest (66), followed by Catholics (48), liberal Protestants (46), and Evangelical Protestants (32). Conversely, when religious nones convey their perceptions toward other religious groups, Buddhists are viewed most positively (67), then Jews and Hindus (61), Catholics and mainline Protestants (55), Muslims (51), Mormons (50), and Evangelical Christians (45) (see Figure 5.1 from page 149 of our book, which includes details on how religious nones, marginal affiliates, and active affiliates view different groups). When we focus more directly on atheists in particular, they are most positive toward Buddhists (67) and negative toward Evangelical Christians (29).

In Canada, a 2015 Angus Reid Institute Survey asked Canadians to rate how positive (+1), neutral (0), or negative (-1) they perceived different (non)religious groups. The following scores capture the net differences across the sample. Mainline Protestants lead the way (+36), followed by Catholics (+35), atheists (+4), Evangelical Christians (+3), Sikhs (-9), Mormons (-17), and Muslims (-29). When we compare perceptions toward atheists in particular, Roman Catholics score just above neutral (+2), followed by mainline Protestants (-6), and Evangelicals in a distant last position (-50). (Limited sample size in traditions outside of Christianity preclude comment). Religious nones, in contrast, reveal more favourable views to Buddhists (+38), Hindus (+8), Jews (+6), and mainline Protestants (+5), and negative perceptions for Sikhs and Catholics (-9), Muslims (-28), Mormons (-35), and Evangelicals (-40).

Building on these survey data, in our interviews we discovered that religious nones tend to be more suspicious and critical of religious groups that they believe are “exclusive,” and more open to groups they perceive to be “inclusive.” Here we share two examples. Sandra and her husband did not expose their children to religion in the home. Sandra was offended when her daughter, a recent convert to Evangelical Christianity, returned home one day with this comment from another member in her newfound Evangelical group: “It’s too bad your parents aren’t Christian.” Sandra described this group as:

 “cultish . . . blind worshipping . . . you can believe whatever you want but always keep your mind open, asking questions. As soon as anybody says to you, ‘don’t ask, just obey,’ that to me is a huge warning sign just to back away from that. It seemed to me that it was a whole lot of just worship . . . There was no critical thinking in it.”

Another interviewee, Patrick, singled out Muslims in his critique of religion:

“the Muslim can’t marry outside your religion . . . It’s like, ‘oh if I like this girl I have to become Muslim’ . . . if you’re a Muslim you can’t marry . . . like what the hell not, like what makes me not good enough anymore?  Just because I’m not in the same religion . . . the Muslim is like not being able to marry outside your circle . . . and then . . . having your wife wear the shawl . . . you can see the control on the woman . . . like it’s you have to follow this, and it’s like, ‘oh, it’s . . . her choice’ . . . yeah it’s her choice because you brainwash her into thinking it was her choice.”

Patrick is not critical toward all religious groups, however:

 “I mean the Buddhist . . . is something that I would identify more towards . . . because they don’t have, per se, as much written . . . and then they’re not as destructive as Muslim and Catholic . . . Like that one is a lot more peaceful and it’s like inner peace.”

In our book we unpack some of the social, cultural, and historical reasons for these perceptions of the “other,” which include considerations of how these perceptions are reinforced or challenged in various institutional settings (e.g., law, media, and education). As The Thomas Theorem in sociology reminds us, our perceptions shape our realities which then become real in their consequences. Therefore, we maintain that it is important to understand the ways that different groups perceive one another, where and why certain (non)polarizing perceptions are advanced or rejected, and ultimately how different (non)religious communities can coexist with one another in diverse and plural contexts in the future.

Keywords: atheists; evangelicals; polarization; diversity; pluralism

Joel Thiessen is professor of sociology and director of the Flourishing Congregations Institute at Ambrose University in Canada. He is the author of The Meaning of Sunday: The Practice of Belief in a Secular Age and co-author of The Millennial Mosaic: How Pluralism and Choice are Shaping Canadian Youth and the Future of Canada.

Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo in Canada. Her research interests include sociology of religion, quantitative methods, social change, race, ethnicity and immigration and political sociology.

Is Mindfulness a Religion for Unbelievers?

In this blog, Sara Rahmani shares some qualitative findings from a longitudinal mixed-methods study exploring the diversity of unbelief in the mindfulness subcultures of the UK and the US.

Mindfulness meditation has entered the mainstream Western culture as a secular and scientific technique that supports physical and mental health. Given this representation, mindfulness meditation is particularly appealing to unbelievers (e.g., atheists, agnostics, and nones) who desire self-transformation yet wish to keep traditional religions at arm’s length.

Two years ago, my colleagues and I started a longitudinal, mixed-method project funded by the Understanding Unbelief program to explore the diversity of unbelief in the mindfulness subcultures of the UK and the US and answer a question unsettling to most practitioners and advocates of this practice: “is mindfulness a secular religion for unbelievers?” In this piece, I summarise the qualitative findings of this two-year study and argue that mindfulness meditation commonly functions as a gateway to secular Buddhism and that mindfulness is best seen as a “scientific spirituality.”

First, I should note that despite what is often claimed, even “secularised” forms of mindfulness are loaded with Buddhist metaphysical assumptions and aim to cultivate, within the practitioner, a particular view of reality [Brown 2016; 2017].  Indeed, most institutionalised mindfulness-based programs gesture towards a comprehensive worldview that have the Buddha’s Four Noble Truth and the Eightfold Path as their conceptual foundation [Husgafvel 2018], although they are often not explicitly addressed as such. Instead, Buddhist concepts are translated into a scientific language and a range of discursive strategies are used to support the claim that mindfulness is inherently secular. For instance, Jon Kabat-Zinn, the founder of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, argues that mindfulness is not “Buddhist” but the “essence” of the Buddha’s teachings, which are “universal” and “compatible with science”; that instead of soteriological concerns, the practice is focused on eradicating “suffering” in the “here and now”; and that mindfulness is distinct from religion because it is an “evidence-based” “tool” that supports “mental health.”

These discourses were also found in the language of our study’s committed mindfulness meditators—most of whom were attracted to mindfulness precisely for its secular framing and validated health benefits. Take, for example, the following passage from my conversation with Juno, who despite identifying with Buddhist teachings, used science as a discursive strategy to argue why mindfulness is distinct from religious categories:

“I’m more keen on science. And with mindfulness the science is evolving. It may be that Jesus and the Buddha had insights into their beings and what made them happy and fulfilled and compassionate to others. And didn’t necessarily have the scientific underpinning of that” (Rahmani, forthcoming).

Besides adopting the same discursive strategies, the analysis of the language of thirty-two unbelievers revealed three common patterns of change, or movement away from a strictly atheist position: (1) atheist Buddhism, (2) agnostic Buddhism, and (3) spirituality. Indeed, there were a few exceptions to these trends. For instance, the case study of an individual who despite increased engagement with mindfulness, remained firmly grounded in her materialistic worldview.

Atheist Buddhism describes the position of those participants who adopted a naturalistic and pragmatic approach to the teachings of the Buddha (dharma). Specifically, they advocated a this-worldly interpretation of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold path and rejected supernatural entities, transcendental realms, and the notion of karma linked to literal rebirth. They rendered any Buddhist concept that violates this secular vision as cultural baggage of ancient India. Beyond the view that Buddhism offers them a rational scheme for addressing human predicament, the atheist Buddhists stressed that their approach to Buddhist ethics are purely intellectual, empirically grounded, and autonomous. In fact, they were most likely to emphasise the individualistic benefits they gained from mindfulness: self-acceptance, self-knowledge, and self-development.

Agnostic Buddhism describes the position of those who also saw the world through the prism of dharma. However, they held an ambivalent position towards metaphysical concepts and transcendental realms or emphasised that it is impossible to assess the validity of these truth claims. These individuals commonly saw mindfulness as a useful tool for dealing with, and confronting, death.  Further, they were most likely to emphasise benefits of mindfulness such as compassion, acceptance, and the ability to regulate one’s emotions. Their narrative displayed a strong sense of ambivalence which sometimes manifested as nostalgia for transcendental experiences (“moments of enlightenment”). Linguistically, the agnostic Buddhists seemed determined to present a coherent worldview and used scientific discourses to resolve any perceived dissonance.  

A linguistic examination of their narrative showed that the atheist and agnostic Buddhists were somewhat self-conscious about their close engagement with Buddhism and this affected their discourse on religion, religious identity, and their attitudes towards religious people. For instance, by associating “atheism” with negative words such as “divisive” and “cynicism,” they implicitly distanced themselves from the label. In addition, unlike other participants, they were eager to demonstrate an understanding of the role religion plays in the lives of believers; they emphasised how their engagement with mindfulness has enabled them to “[stop] seeing religion quite as much as a threat and more as a place you can go to for resources.” In fact, most atheist and agnostic Buddhists were happy to frame their private practice of mindfulness as a “spiritual” exercise, inasmuch as the term spirituality was associated with self-development and not with some higher power.

Those who took a spiritual turn, in contrast, commonly conceptualised “religion” in a negative light and reported damaging childhood experiences with religious institutions and people. A central facet of their narratives involved a “spiritual experience,” which often occurred in the context of a meditation retreat. According to their stories, these experiences marked a significant transformation in their views: a conversion from unbelief to belief in a higher realm. I would loosely describe the language of these participants as a peculiar amalgamation of spirituality and Buddhist modernist discourse. They had a selective approach to Buddha’s teachings and believed in the existence of an impersonal higher power, life after death, and the human soul. Yet their negative perception of religion, coupled with a commitment to present the practice in secular light, enticed them to conceal from others (their peers, students, and sometimes their spouses) the fact that their personal mindfulness practice had changed gears towards a spiritual end (e.g., “connecting with the source”). 

Regardless of whether these participants developed an affinity towards Buddhism or whether mindfulness fulfilled a spiritual role in their personal lives, the vast majority of the participants were happy to compartmentalise their personal beliefs from their professional approach to teaching mindfulness. Moreover, most did not consider the strategic rebranding of the practice as ethically problematic. As one participant argued, “you say potato, I say potāto. You say dukkha and I say discrepancy-based processing.”

In sum, the longitudinal data demonstrated that for many practitioners, mindfulness functioned as a gateway to secular Buddhism. For other (also former) unbelievers, it changed their relationship to the transcendence on both “vertical and horizontal” axes (Streib and Klein 2013)—vertical refers to the world beyond, whereas horizontal transcendence captures this-worldly experiences that go beyond the mundane. These apparent shifts in the participants’ worldviews, coupled with the fact that scientific representations of mindfulness were an integral pull factor for unbelievers in the first place, warrants the label “scientific spirituality” for mindfulness meditation.

Sources Cited

Brown, Candy Gunther, 2016. “Can ‘Secular’ Mindfulness Be Separated from Religion?” In Handbook of Mindfulness: Culture, Context, and Social Engagement, edited by Ronald E. Purser, David Forbes, and Adam Burke, 75–94. Mindfulness in Behavioral Health. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

———. 2017. “Ethics, Transparency, and Diversity in Mindfulness Programs.” In Practitioner’s Guide to Ethics and Mindfulness-Based Interventions, edited by Lynette M. Monteiro, Jane F. Compson, and Frank Musten, 45–85. Mindfulness in Behavioral Health. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Husgafvel, V., 2018. “The ‘Universal Dharma Foundation’ of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction: Non-Duality and Mahayana Buddhist Influences in the Work of on Kabat-Zinn.” Contemporary Buddhism 19(2): 275-326.

Rahmani, M. (forthcoming) “Secular Rhetoric as a Legitimating Strategy for Mindfulness Meditation.” In Routledge Handbook of Yoga and Meditation Studies, edited by  Newcombe, S., and O’Brien-Kop, K.. Routledge.

Streib, H., and Klein, C., 2013. “Atheists, Agnostics, and Apostates.” In APA Handbook of Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality, Volume 1, edited by K.I. Pargament, J. Exline, and J.W. Jones, 713–728. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Dr Masoumeh Sara Rahmani is a researcher and lecturer in Religious Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. She has held a Research Associate position in the Brain, Belief, and Behaviour Lab at Coventry University. She received her PhD in this field from University of Otago in 2017. Her research interests include Meditation movements, New Religious Movements, Religious discourse, and Asian religions in non-Asian contexts.