Masato Kato presents an analysis of what he calls a ‘non-religious’ expression of a Japanese religion that has been operating in France since the 1970s. He explores how the translation of a ‘religious tradition’ into a ‘culture’ has been perceived in the changing cultural and socio-political conditions in French society.

Can religious traditions be explained non-religiously? A religious group often attempts to present their traditions as culture in order to increase their visibility and gain legitimacy in the sense of ‘social acceptance’ (Lewis 2003:15) in the public. A group known as Tenrikyō has sought to present itself in French society by translating the image of the little known religious tradition into widely appreciated representations associated with Japan. In the operation of translation, Tenrikyō has faced with not only cultural and linguistic challenges but also been caught up in the socio-political condition, being swayed by how society defines and perceives what ‘religious’ activities are.

Originally started as a religious movement in nineteenth-century rural Japan, Tenrikyō has expanded into different parts of the world including France, where its main centre of activities in Europe is located. Aside from the religious association known as Tenrikyo Europe Centre (formerly Tenrikyo Mission Centre in Paris), which was established in 1970 in Antony, a southern suburb of Paris, Tenrikyō founded a legally separate institution called Association Culturelle Franco-Japonaise de TENRI (Tenri France-Japan Cultural Association) in Paris. Founded in 1971 as part of the initiative to reach out to the wider society through cultural exchange between France and Japan, the Cultural Association has been running various programmes mainly associated with Japanese culture including a Japanese language school as well as other activities such as calligraphy, Japanese tea ceremony, and Japanese flower arrangement, among several others.

In terms of the relations with the religious association, the Cultural Association does not conduct any form of proselytisation in its activities as per the French legal regulation prohibiting such activities in a non-religious association (Interviews on 11 November 2014 and 8 July 2015; cf. Koizumi 2005). One can in fact notice when visiting the Cultural Association that there is very little that can be linked with the religious tradition or its religious symbols, except for the name Tenri as well as some of the doctrinal phrases posted on the wall in the form of ‘Japanese calligraphy’ (fieldwork observation). It is commonly understood among Tenrikyō followers working as senior staff members of the Association that cultural activities are intended as contribution to the larger society, in the process of which they hope to have the little known name Tenri recognised among the general public. In this sense, the promotion of cultural activities at the Association is considered by those followers as a ‘non-religious’ way of ‘insertion in society’ (Beckford and Levasseur 1986:41, cf. Beckford 1985) that may help translate the appreciation of the Japanese culture into that of the religious tradition.

In what ways and in what context, then, has this approach allowed the religious group to increase its visibility and legitimacy in France? For one thing, Tenrikyō’s expansion into France has met with a period of growing (and revitalised) interests in Japanese culture and language in France due to Japan’s rapid economic growth that occurred from toward the end of 1970s (Mabuchi 1997:10-12). This is attested in part by the increasing number of Japanese language institutes and students in France in the decades after the 1970s (see Table 1). It can be observed that the relatively high level of interests in Japanese culture in France has generally correlated with the increasing number of students at the Japanese language school of the Cultural Association (see Table 2).

 

(Sources: Kokusai Gakuyūkai 1967; Kokusai Kōryū Kikin 1975, 1981, 1987, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013; Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā 1992, 1995, 2000; Shuppan Bunka Kokusai Kōryūkai 1970; cf. Iwakiri 2007a, 2007b)

 

(Sources: Iwakiri 2007b:10; Kokusai Gakuyūkai 1967; Kokusai Kōryū Kikin 1975, 1981, 1987, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013; Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā 1992, 1995, 2000; Shuppan Bunka Kokusai Kōryūkai 1970; cf. Iwakiri 2007a, 2007b)

Aside from the initiative to connect with the local people, there were some cases in which they sought to translate religious language and representations into ‘non-religious’ or ‘cultural’ counterparts, particularly in the period between the 1980s and the early 1990s. One of the most intriguing examples of such expressions is a quarterly magazine called Le Japon, which was published for a total of 14 volumes between 1979 and 1983 by the Cultural Association for the purpose of introducing the current news of Japanese society as well as various aspects of Japanese culture in both Japanese and French. Worth noting about this publication is that each volume has a short article entitled ‘Tenri yūgen’ (a keyword of Tenrikyo), which was written by a non-member of Tenrikyō. Placed at the very end of each volume, the article discusses a selected doctrinal concept of Tenrikyō as one of the intellectual thoughts in Japan without any explicit messages of proselytisation or sectarian interests.

At the same time, however, there were some cases in which the non-religious expressions of Tenrikyō were problematised or challenged by the wider general public due to the shifting social discourse surrounding ‘cults’ (sectes) in France. The French ‘cult controversy’ (Beckford 1985) became prominent from about the 1970s and eventually led to the National Assembly’s report on ‘cults in France’ in 1996 and later to the About-Picard Law in 2001, which significantly limits legal right of groups labelled as ‘cults’ (Altglas 2008, 2010). Notable about this anti-cult sentiment is the changing scope of the very term ‘cult’. The emphasis in the discourse of ‘cults’ in France has shifted at the turn of the 21st century to signify ‘allegations of psychological manipulation, fraud and anti-democratic tendencies’ (Beckford 2004:29; emphasis added). Seen as ‘social deviance’ rather than ‘religious dissidence’, a cult group has come to encompass ‘a wide range of organizations and practices’ that transgress social ‘norms and laws’ (Altglas 2010:501-503).

This indeed explains what happened to the Cultural Association at the height of the cult controversy. In 1996, the Cultural Association was portrayed as a ‘cult’ group in one of the local newspaper in the 14^th district of Paris, where the Cultural Association was located at the time. Labelling Tenrikyō’s cultural association as ‘Cult Tenri’, the article asserts that people fell ‘victim’ to the ‘cult’ through the activities conducted at the association (La Page, no. 28, January 1996, p.4). In this case, the cultural association was viewed as a sort of front organisation to lure people into religious activities conducted at Tenrikyo Europe Centre in Antony. As a matter of fact, Tenrikyō was not one of the organisations of Japanese origin that were listed in the aforementioned 1996 report on ‘cults’ in France. The irony here is that the approach of using representations of Japanese culture as a way to present a ‘non-religious’ image of a religious tradition in the public led to an instance of illegitimacy due to the countervailing social dynamic of the cult controversy. The extent to which the translation of religious tradition into as part of the wider culture can be effectively carried out thus relies on how such an expression is seen in a given social context.

The case of Tenrikyō in France provides a window through which we can see the possibility and limitation of an approach that translates religious representations into cultural counterparts that are appreciated in the wider host society. Research on similar expressions in different religious groups in different contexts may further reveal insights pertaining to the translation of ‘religion’ into ‘non-religion/culture’.

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References

Altglas, Véronique. 2008. French Cult Controversy at the Turn of the New Millennium: Escalation, Dissensions and New Forms of Mobilisations across the Battlefield. In The Centrality of Religion in Social Life: Essays in Honour of James A. Beckford, edited by Eileen Barker, 55-68. Hampshire: Ashgate.

––––––. 2010. Laïcité is What Laïcité Does: Rethinking the French Cult Controversy. Current Sociology 58(3):489-510.

Beckford, James A. 1985. Cult Controversies: The Societal Response to New Religious Movements. London: Tavistock Publications.

––––––. 2004. ‘Laïcité,’ ‘Dystopia,’ and the Reaction to New Religious Movements in France. In Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, edited by James T. Richardson. New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers.

Beckford, James A., and Martine Levasseur. 1986. New Religious Movements in Western Europe. In New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change, edited by James A. Beckford, 29-54. London: Sage Publications.

Iwakiri, Kōichi. 2007a. Shukkō kihon hōkoku Tenri Nichi-Futsu bunka kyōkai de no kinmu wo oete (4): Bunka kyōkai no kaiin ni tsuite. Tenrikyō kaigaibu hō 511:12.

––––––. 2007b. Shukkō kihon hōkoku Tenri Nichi-Futsu bunka kyōkai de no kinmu wo oete (5): Nihongo gakkō no unei nit suite. Tenrikyō kaigaibu hō 512:10.

Koizumi Yōichi. 2005. Seikyō bunri no hō: Furansu ni okeru raishite to hōritsu, kenpō, jōyaku. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha.

Kokusai Gakuyūkai. 1967. Kaigai ni okeru Nihongo kyōiku kikan ichiran (Taiyōshū, Yōroppashū, Amerikashū hen). Tokyo: Kokusai Gakuyūkai.

Kokusai Kōryū Kikin, ed. 1975. ‘Sōhyō’. In Kaigai Nihongo kyōiku kikan ichiran. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin.

––––––. 1981. ‘Sōhyō’. In Kaigai Nihongo kyōiku kikan ichiran. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin.

––––––. 1987. ‘Sōhyō’. In Kaigai Nihongo kyōiku kikan ichiran. Tokyo: Bonjinsha.

––––––. 2005. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū (sōsū)’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 2003 nen, 94-97. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin.

––––––. 2008. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū (sōsū)’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 2006 nen, 92-95. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin.

––––––. 2011. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 2009 nen, 140-143. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin.

––––––. 2013. ‘Sōkatsuhyō 1-1a: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: 2012 nendo kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa yori, 172-175. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.

Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā, ed. 1992. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū (sōsū)’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 1990 nen, 38-41. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā.

––––––. 1995. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū (sōsū)’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 1993 nen, 74-79. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā.

––––––. 2000. Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā. 2000. ‘Shukeihyō 1-1: Nihongo kyōiku kikansū, kyōshisū, gakushūshasū (sōsū)’. In Kaigai no Nihongo kyōiku no genjō: Kaigai Nihongo kyoiku kikan chōsa 1998 nen, 108-111. Tokyo: Kokusai Kōryū Kikin Nihongo Kokusai Sentā.

Lewis, James R. 2003. Legitimating New Religions. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Mabuchi, Akiko. 1997. Japonisumu: Gensō no Nihon. Tokyo: Brucke.

Shuppan Bunka Kokusai Kōryūkai. 1970. Sekai no Nihongo kyōiku kikan ichiran. Tokyo: Shuppan Bunka Kokusai Kōryūkai.

Website

Association Culturelle Franco-Japonaise de Tenri. http://tenri-paris.com (accessed on 22 December 2016).

 

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Masato Kato is in the final year of his PhD in the Department of Religions and Philosophies at SOAS University of London. His doctoral research focuses on a Japanese new religion known as Tenrikyō as it operates in France. He is particularly looking at the historical and social construction of the boundary between ‘Japan’ and ‘Tenrikyō’ with regards to the perceived cultural particularity of the religious tradition as well as the non-religious/cultural approach of propagation that the religious organisation has employed in the French context.

 

Rebecca Catto introduces new project findings from social scientific research conducted in Canada and the UK. She highlights the tendency of non-religious publics and life scientists in both countries to see science and religion as conflicting.

The “conflict thesis” is the label historians of science give to the purported essential and enduring incompatibility or clash between science and religion. However, today this thesis is considered historically inaccurate (Harrison, 2015, Lightman, 2015). So, why then does it persist? This gap between narratives, perceptions, and knowledge was part of the motivation for the current Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum project.[1] Given that the US is already the most researched country and a distinctively polarized one in terms of science and religion debates (Baker, 2012, Ecklund and Park, 2009, Evans and Evans, 2008, Evans, 2016, Guhin, 2016, Hill, 2014, Long, 2011, Noy and O’Brien, 2016), we chose to focus upon two cognate and yet contrasting national contexts: Canada and the UK.[2] The multidisciplinary, multi-sited[3] team has been conducting qualitative sociological, historical, psychological, and survey research in both countries. We also decided to concentrate upon the relationship between evolution and religion, because this has become a focal point for wider science and religion debates (Aechtner, 2016). Fern Elsdon-Baker, a philosopher and historian of science, leads the project and her work has already begun to draw out how such a “clash” gets framed (Elsdon-Baker, 2009, Elsdon-Baker, 2015). I work on the qualitative strand of the project, alongside Stephen Jones and Tom Kaden.

Here I draw upon initial findings from some of the project’s sociological research to illustrate the observation that non-religious people in Canada and the UK appear to be the most likely to perceive a necessary clash between science and religion. Stephen and Tom have conducted semi-structured interviews (123 total) and focus groups (15 total) with scientifically literate publics and life scientists in the UK and Canada, sampled purposively in order to gain a balance in terms of gender, as well as a range of religious identities, geographic locations within both countries, ethnic backgrounds, and age groups. The sample includes 25 ‘non-religious’ scientists and 31 ‘non-religious’ members of the public.[4]

Among the nonreligious members of the public interviewed, some saw science as important to their identity and thinking, even when their experience and expertise in scientific disciplines were limited. For example, Basil Tipton,[5] a non-religious male member of the Canadian public, said: “But I will say, in fairness, that I’ve seen survey data of scientists and their religious beliefs and I’m always surprised by how many profess to have religious beliefs. It always does surprise me… Objective truth, philosophically loaded word, but taking it at face value for a moment, I guess I would see it as almost part of my identity, that, if that’s the tradeoff to be made, I think I would always want to be on the side of understanding the world and objective truth versus self-comfort.”

Non-religious life scientists in Canada and the UK also struggled to see how a religious person could be a (good) scientist. A non-religious biologist originally from Latin America now working in Canada, told Tom: “So in science, I agree with Dawkins that to be a really good scientist, to actually have a scientific thinking, you…it’s very incompatible if you’re religious.” Another female Canadian biologist said: “I am always surprised when I find religious scientists, because again it’s the, how do you…?” She went on to describe how she has questioned her own husband on his Lutheran upbringing and beliefs. A non-religious British zoologist reported finding it difficult to understand how his medical biologist colleague could publicly “argue the case for religion.” In one focus group with scientists in Canada a staunchly anti-religious participant dominated discussion, and in one with actively non-religious members of the public in the UK the assumption that Islam in particular is anti-science predominated.

This perception held by non-religious participants, that religious scientists, or indeed publics, will struggle to reconcile their religious identity with science as a practice or a scientific world view, is a recurring theme across the project. Emerging data from our survey and psychological research appear to chime with what we have found in our interviews. We must stress, though, that not all non-religious project participants see religion and science as in conflict, and many non-religious scientist interviewees reported that, despite difficulties understanding such a position, they were tolerant of private belief and spirituality, as long as the religious scientist is doing high quality work.

Despite the commonalities in terms of views found in both contexts, Canadian scientists appear to be less aware of their colleagues’ religious or non-religious views than in the UK. Also, the “conflict thesis” appears to form a less significant part of public discourse. This could be due to the relative influence of the New Atheists in British popular culture (LeDrew, 2016). Whilst we still have a lot more analysis to do, the initial data suggest that understanding the persistent power of the “conflict thesis” requires examination of non-religious as well as religious people’s views, in context.

[1] Funded by the Templeton Religion Trust.

[2] The recently completed ‘Religion Among Scientists in International Context’ (RASIC) project led by Elaine Howard Ecklund is, as findings are published, also making a significant contribution to the social scientific study of science and religion internationally.

[3] The project is hosted at Newman University, UK, in partnership with York University, Toronto. The University of Kent, The British Library, Kent State University, and the British Science Association are also project partners.

[4] Here the label ‘non-religious’ incorporates both people declaring an active stance in contrast to religion, e.g. atheist, and those only stating that they are not religious.

[5] We use pseudonyms to preserve participants’ anonymity and are very grateful to everyone who volunteered to take part in the research.

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References

AECHTNER, T. 2016. Terrorism in the Evolution Wars: Mass Media and Human Nature. Theology and Science, 14, 495-517.

BAKER, J. O. 2012. Perceptions of Science and American Secularism. Sociological Perspectives, 55, 167-188.

ECKLUND, E. H. & PARK, J. Z. 2009. Conflict Between Religion and Science Among Academic Scientists? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48, 276-292.

ELSDON-BAKER, F. 2009. The selfish genius: how Richard Dawkins rewrote Darwin’s legacy, London, Icon Books.

ELSDON-BAKER, F. 2015. Creating creationists: The influence of ‘issues framing’ on our understanding of public perceptions of clash narratives between evolutionary science and belief. Public Underst Sci, 24, 422-39.

EVANS, J. H. & EVANS, M. S. 2008. Religion and Science: Beyond the Epistemological Conflict Narrative. Annual Review of Sociology, 34, 87-105.

EVANS, M. S. 2016. Seeking Good Debate: Religion, Science, and Conflict in American Public Life, Oakland, California, University of California Press.

GUHIN, J. 2016. Why Worry about Evolution? Boundaries, Practices, and Moral Salience in Sunni and Evangelical High Schools. Sociological Theory, 34, 151-174.

HARRISON, P. 2015. The Territories of Science and Religion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

HILL, J. 2014. Rejecting Evolution: The Role of Religion, Education, and Social Networks. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53, 575-594.

LEDREW, S. 2016. The Evolution of Atheism: The Politics of a Modern Movement, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LIGHTMAN, B. 2015. The ‘Conflict Thesis’ and Scientific Naturalism. State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide, 4, 11-35.

LONG, D. E. 2011. Evolution and religion in American education: an ethnography, Dordrecht ; London, Springer.

NOY, S. & O’BRIEN, T. L. 2016. A Nation Divided: Science, Religion, and Public Opinion in the United States. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, 2.

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Dr Rebecca Catto is an assistant professor in the Sociology department at Kent State University, Ohio, USA. Her main research interest is in religious-secular relations, in the UK and internationally. She is currently a Co-Investigator on ‘Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum’. Recent publications include work on Islam in Europe, material atheism, and the sociology of religion. She co-edited with Linda Woodhead Religion and Change in Modern Britain (Routledge, 2012).